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I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in medical science that permit the artificial maintenance of cir-
culation, respiration, and nourishment functions are forcing changes in the way
the law looks at death. Historically, cardiopulmonary cessation was the sole cri-
terion for determination of death.' Now, however, the vast majority of states
supplement the cardiopulmonary test for death with a whole brain death stan-
dard, pursuant to which death is declared when there is irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.2 The condition of
permanent vegetative state, as exists in the patient in a recent Wisconsin case'
and as many as 25,000 other patients in the United States,4 is today pressing
the law for yet another supplement to the legal definition of death. The absence
of readily available and absolute diagnostic tests for determining whether a pa-
tient is in a permanent vegetative state, however, may render premature any
consideration of neocortical brain death, or permanent vegetative state,5 in the
legal definition of death. This article examines the development of the whole
brain definition of death, the clinical realities of permanent vegetative state,
case law treatment of decisions to withhold treatment from those in a perma-
nent vegetative state, and a proposed Model Permanent Vegetative State Treat-
ment Statute.
II. WHOLE BRAIN DEATH
Due to the development of sophisticated life-support technologies over the
last twenty years, society has reexamined and attempted to clarify the legal
definition of death. Since the 1968 publication of the "Harvard Criteria" for
* J.D. Harvard Law School, 1977, Director of Center for Study of Bioethics, Associate Professor of
Biocethics Medical College of Wisconsin; Associate, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
I. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Defining Death: A Report on the Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death 5
(1981) [hereinafter President's Commission, Defining Death]. Cardiopulmonary death is indicated by absence of
pulse and a flat-line electrocardiographic response. Youngner & Bartlett, Human Death and High Technology:
The Failure of Whole-Brain Formulations, 99 ANN. INTERN. MED. 252, 253 (1983).
2. See President's Commission, Defining Death, supra note 1, at 32-8.
3. In the Matter of the Guardianship of L.W., Case No. 89-1197, Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
4. Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support, 263 (3) J.A.M.A.
426. 427 (1990). Report of the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs [hereinafter "Persistent Vegetative State"].
5. Neocortical brain death embraces the condition of permanent vegetative state. It defines a clinical con-
dition in which the critical elements of the central nervous system have been destroyed, leaving the patient in an
irreversible unconscious condition. It occurs "when the brain damage is permanent and sufficiently severe that the
individual is thereafter unable to maintain homeostasis (i.e., gives no self-awareness and is unable to respond
behaviorally in any major or appropriate way to the environment), even though the brain stem may continue to
maintain internal (vegetative) homeostasis." F. PLUM & J. POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 313
(3d ed. 1982).
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brain death," a growing consensus has rejected the traditional exclusive reliance
on heart-lung death criteria, wherein a person is deemed to be legally dead if he
has sustained irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.
Forty states and the District of Columbia now have statutes that incorporate
whole brain death into their definitions of death;' and courts in six other states
have adopted a whole brain death definition."
In addition, numerous professional groups, including the American Bar As-
sociation, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Neu-
rology, the American Electroencephalographic Society, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (hereinafter "President's Commission") have endorsed the Uniform
Determination of Death Act,9 which incorporates both cardiopulmonary and
whole-brain-based criteria for the determination of death:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entir'. brain,
including the brain stem, is dead?
Once death (by either standard) has been diagnosed in accordance with ac-
cepted medical criteria, the pronouncement of death and discontinuation of life
support systems are mandatory. The ethical principles of autonomy and benefi-
cence, as well as the patient's previously expressed wishes, and the wishes of the
family, are not relevant to the decision to discontinue life support systems.
While some contend that the main objective of the development of brain death
was to enhance the ease and efficiency in transplanting donated organs, the
President's Commission notes that a major benefit is to replace artificial support
6. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 (6) J.A.M.A. 337 (1968).
7. ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 9.65.120 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-101 (1987);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7181 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-279(h)(b) (West Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (Supp.
Pamphlet); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1979 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327 C-I (1976 & Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1h para. 302 (Smith - Hurd 1978); IND. CODE
ANN. § 1-1-4-3(a) (Burns 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1990);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (1989); MD. HEALTH - GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202 (Supp. 1985); MicH.
Comp. LAWS § 333.1021 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West Supp. 1990); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3
(1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.005 (1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323
(1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Anderson Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West Supp.
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10203 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-4-16 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (Law. Co-op 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501(b) (1987);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4447t (Vernon 1990); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1987); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2973 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-1 (1989); WIs. STAT. § 146.71 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-
19-101 (1988).
8. State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 185-86, 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373
Mass. 249, 251-55, 366 N.E.2d 744, 747-49 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); State v. Meints, 212
Neb. 410, 419-20, 322 N.W.2d 809, 814 (1982); State v. Watson, 191 N.J. Super. 464, 466, 467 A.2d 590, 591
(1983); People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 356-57, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 444-45 (1984); In re
Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980).
9. See A. MORACZEWSKI & J. SHOWALTOR, DETERMINATION OF DEATH 27-28 (1982).
10. Unif. Determination of Death Act § I, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1985).
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with more fitting and respectful behavior once a person has become a dead
body."1
III. PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATE
When total brain death occurs, there is cessation not only of higher cere-
bral functions (consciousness, awareness, control of important voluntary and in-
voluntary actions), but also of all brain stem functions. Persons who are in a
permanent vegetative state are not totally brain dead because their brain stems
are relatively intact. They thus demonstrate a number of normal brain stem
functions, such as cycles of sleep and wakefulness (with eyes open), the ability
to breathe and maintain blood pressure unassisted, pupillary responses to light,
the utterance of unintelligible instinctive grunts or screams, sporadic movements
of facial muscles and non-paralyzed limbs, and gag and cough reflexes. In addi-
tion, cardiorespiratory activity, swallowing, and digestive and other nonneuro-
logical vital functions are usually preserved to an extent that standard nutri-
tional and supportive measures will sustain life indefinitely.12
Nonetheless, persons in permanent vegetative state demonstrate a total loss
of cerebral cortical functioning;' 3 they are permanently and irreversibly devoid
of any awareness, thought, or feelings.' 4 Thus, for permanently vegetative pa-
tients, "personality, memory, purposive action, social interaction . . . joy, satis-
faction and pleasure [are forever gone] . '15 Moreover, such patients do not and
will never experience pain or suffering. According to the American Academy of
Neurology,
[p]ersistent vegetativt, state patients do not have the capacity to experience pain or
suffering. Pain and suffering are attributes of consciousness requiring cerebral cortical
functioning, and patients who are permanently and completely unconscious cannot ex-
perience these symptoms58
Permanent vegetative state often results when a patient suffers a cardiac or
respiratory arrest causing lack of blood flow (ischemia) or oxygen (hypoxia) to
the brain for a period of time.' The cerebral cortex is the part of the brain
most vulnerable to blood flow deprivation because of its high metabolic rate,
which requires a constant supply of blood, oxygen, and glucose. The brain stem,
however, is fairly resistant to ischemia or hypoxia.' 8
11. President's Commission, Defining Death, supra note 1, at 23-24.
12. Persistent Vegetative State, supra note 4, at 427.
13. Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of
the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39(1) NEUROLOGY 125 (1989) [hereinafter Care and Management].
14. F. PLUM & J. POSNER, supra note 5, at 313.
15. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, 174-75, 181-82 (1983) [hereinafter Deciding to Forego
Life-Sustaining Treatment].
16. Care and Management, supra note 13, at 125.
17. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), 18 HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP. 27, 28 (February/March 1988).
18. Id. The condition of total cognitive loss can also develop more slowly as an end result of progressive
structural disorders, such as Alzheimer's disease, that in their end stages can also destroy the psychological func-
tions of the cerebrum. Persistent Vegetative State, supra note 4, at 427.
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A diagnosis of the permanent vegetative state usually can be made with a
reasonably high degree of reliability within weeks or months after the original
injury by a physician skilled in neurological diagnosis2x9 However, unlike whole
brain death, while there are generally accepted criteria for diagnosis of perma-
nent vegetative state, there does not exist one single, detailed, published set of
specific and certain medical criteria that can be applied to determine with cer-
tainty whether a person is in a permanent vegetative state. 0 Moreover, there
have been a few unexpected recoveries of cognitive functions in situations where
neurologists diagnosed permanent vegetative state using the generally accepted
criteria.21 Furthermore, there are no specific, widely used laboratory tests to
confirm the clinical diagnosis of permanent vegetative state.22 After weeks or
sometimes months, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and computerized axial
tomography (CAT) scanning "will show extensive structural damage to the cer-
ebral hemispheres consistent with the clinical diagnosis, but these studies are
not quantifiable. ''23 In addition, depending on the cause and duration of the
condition, brain imaging studies may not reveal multifocal or diffuse lesions and
cortical atrophy.2 4
There is one diagnostic tool that may supply the required certainty to a
diagnosis of permanent vegetative state. The positron emission tomography
(PET) scan can quantitatively measure the metabolic rates of glucose and oxy-
gen in various parts of the brain, including the cerebral cortex.25 Since con-
sciousness cannot be sustained below certain quantifiable levels of metabolism,
the PET scan is an important index in the confirmation of a clinical diagnosis of
permanent vegetative state.26 The PET scan, however, is extremely expensive,
and few medical centers throughout the country currently have equipment nec-
essary to perform it. In addition, there are still insufficient data to confirm un-
equivocally the value of this test in diagnosing permanent vegetative state.27
It is not uncommon for a patient in a permanent vegetative state to survive
for five to twenty years.2 8 The variable survival periods of such patients depend
on age (older patients develop more medical complications secondary to pro-
longed immobility and unresponsiveness than do younger patients); economic,
19. Cranford, supra note 17 at 29; Care and Management, supra note 13, at 125.
20. Cranford, supra note 17, at 29.
21. Id. See also Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 15, at 179-80 (1983) (citing two
known cases of recovery of conciousness after a year of being in a persistent vegetative state); Persistent Vegeta-
tive State, supra note 4, at 428 (noting that "these rare examples [of recovery of consciousness] notwithstanding,
data indicate with high probability the lengths of time, according to age and the nature of the disease, when
patients can safely be regarded as having reached a permanent, hopeless vegetative state. . . . If the handful of
reported occurrences of cognitive recovery in patients [in a persistent vegetative state] are divided by the total
estimated number of (those] cases in this country, the odds of recovery are less than I in 1,000.").
22. Cranford, supra note 17, at 30.
23. Id.
24. Persistent Vegetative State, supra note 4, at 427.
25. Cranford, supra note 17, at 30.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Karen Ann Quinlan lapsed into irreversible persistent vegetative state in 1975, and died in June of 1985.
N.Y. Times. March 30, 1986 at 8, col. 1.
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family, and institutional factors; natural resistance of the patients' bodies to
infections; and the effectiveness of the patients' gag and cough reflexes.29
The cost of maintaining patients in a permanent vegetative state varies by
state and type of institution."0 For example, in Minnesota, yearly costs are
18,000 to 25,000 dollars; in Massachusetts, costs are approximately 120,000
dollars per year." One neurologist estimated that with costs3 2 from a monthly
low of 2,000 dollars to a high of 10,000 dollars, and assuming there are 5,000 to
10,000 permanent vegetative state patients in the United States, the annual na-
tional health bill for these patients ranges from 120 million dollars to 1.2 billion
dollars. This estimate does not include the high costs of the first year of care
after the original injury when most such patients spend extensive time in inten-
sive care.33
IV. CASE LAW INVOLVING TERMINATION OF TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN
PERMANENT VEGETATIVE STATES
Many state and federal courts have recognized that an individual's federal
and state constitutional rights to privacy encompass the right to control his or
her medical course and to be free of unwanted treatment, including artificial
nutrition and hydration.3 ' Case law has also firmly established that the right to
refuse treatment is not lost merely because the "noncognitive and vegetative
condition of the patient prevents a conscious exercise of the choice to refuse
further extraordinary treatment."3 5 Courts have followed two different ap-
proaches to accommodate the meaningful implementation of an incompetent pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment: the substituted judgment approach
and the best interests approach.
The substituted judgment approach is "a decisional process whereby an
attempt is made to ascertain what an incompetent patient would have done if he
29. Cranford, supra note 17, at 31.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Cranford, supra note 17.
33. Id. at 31-2.
34. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz.
207, 214, 741 P.2d 674, 682-3 (1987); Drabick v. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 207, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 853
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Ct. App.
1984); McConnell v. Beverly Enter., 209 Conn. 692, 701, 553 A.2d 596, 601 (1989); Foody v. Manchester Memo-
rial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132, 482 A.2d 713, 717-18 (Super. Ct. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 421 A.2d. 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984); In re L.H.R.,
253 Ga. 439, 446, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430-31,
497 N.E.2d 626, 633-64 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-
40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-25 (1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
41, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987); Leach v. Akron
General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (C.P. 1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
120, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983).
35. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984). Accord In re
L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 440, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (1984). See also Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn.
Supp. 127, 132, 482 A.2d 713, 718 (Super. Ct. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Minn. 1984); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359-60, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
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were competent.""8 While some courts have authorized termination of treat-
ment of patients in a permanent vegetative state and of patients who are other-
wise severely ill on the basis of the substituted judgment test,37 others have
applied evidentiary standards that have been so stringent as to be insurmounta-
ble, despite the eminent reasonableness of nontreatment in the circumstances.
In In re Westchester County Medical Center,38 for instance, the daughters and
a co-employee of an elderly patient who was severely and irreparably brain
damaged testified that she had repeatedly stated that she would not want artifi-
cial means used to sustain her life if she were to become unable to care for
herself. Both the trial court and intermediate appellate court found this evi-
dence of the patient's prior intent to refuse treatment to be persuasive.3 9 Never-
theless, the New York Court of Appeals required insertion of a nasogastic feed-
ing tube, on grounds that the patient's prior expressions of distaste for artificial
life-supporting measures did not meet the "clear and convincing" evidentiary
standard.40
In a previous New York case,4' the court also required evidence regarding
a patient's treatment termination preference to be clear and convincing in order
for the treatment to be terminated.42 Brother Fox, the patient in the case, was
placed on a respirator after he suffered a heart attack during surgery that re-
sulted in severe brain damage and an inability to breathe.43 In past discussions
about the Quinlan case,44 Brother Fox had stated that he did not want any
"extraordinary business" done for him if he became respirator dependent.45 In
ruling on a request for discontinuation of his respirator, the court held that in
order for such a ruling to issue, evidence concerning Brother Fox's preferences
had to meet the clear and convincing standard.4" As the court itself noted, the
clear and convincing standard approaches the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
quantum of proof necessary to convict a criminal defendant. 47 Because Brother
Fox had made clear statements which the court labeled "solemn pronounce-
36. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 497 (4th Cir. 1987). See also Deciding to Forego Life-Sus-
taining Treatment, supra note 15, at 132.
37. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 424, 529 A.2d 434, 444-45 (1987). See also In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 384-
85, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987).
38. 72 N.Y. 2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
39. Id. at 523, 530-35, 531 N.E.2d at 608, 612-615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887, 982-94. The patient, Mrs.
O'Connor, suffers from multiinfarct dementia, which resulted from a series of strokes. This condition has substan-
tially impaired her cognitive abilities, but she is not in a coma or vegetative state. Id. at 524, 531 N.E.2d at 609,
534 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
40. Id., at 523, 531 N.E.2d at 608, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
41. In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1979), affd sub nom. Soper v. Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 379-80, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (1981).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
44. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1987). For many people, the Quinlan case aroused widespread
debate and "symbolized the ethical problems posed by the development of life-sustaining treatment that could
prolong a life that was bereft of virtually everything that made life meaningful." N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985 at 2,
col. 5.
45. Sopar, 52 N.Y.2d at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
46. Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
47. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
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ments"48 specifically mentioning respirators, the court allowed discontinuation
of the respirator.4
In Cruzan v. Harmon,50 a Missouri trial court concluded after three full
days of evidence that the permanently vegetative patient would have chosen to
forego the ongoing intrusion of her gastrostomy tube, based on the patient's
conversations with her friends and family and on the overwhelming evidence of
"her lifestyle." 5' Yet, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that this
evidence as to the patient's wishes was inherently unreliable and thus insuffi-
cient to support the co-guardians' claim of right to exercise substituted judg-
ment on the patient's behalf.
52
The evidentiary standards applied by courts in these cases are simply un-
workable because they require persons to exercise foresight that they do not and
could not possess. Many persons never express their preferences, either in writ-
ten or oral form, regarding specific treatment options under specific circum-
stances. Yet, nothing other than such explicit statements for or against treat-
ment termination seems more than merely inferential in such cases. While
surrogates may be able to use their knowledge of the incompetent patient's
views about life, about the afterlife, and about the illnesses of others to assert
the patient's intent, pursuant to the substituted judgment test, even inferences
from this type of evidence cannot lead to the clear, unambiguous proof required
by the Westchester County Medical Center, and Cruzan courts. Moreover, it is
impossible to apply the substituted judgment approach when incompetent pa-
tients, such as L.W., have no close family members or friends, and knowledge of
their values and previously expressed treatment preferences is unavailable.
V. THE CASE OF L.W. AND THE "BEST INTERESTS" APPROACH TO
TREATMENT TERMINATION
L.W. is a seventy-nine year old man who currently resides in a nursing
home. Even prior to his cardiorespiratory arrest in May 1989, he suffered
chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
and iron deficiency anemia, and on account of these conditions, was placed
under guardianship. L.W. has no close family members or friends; his guardian
is an employee of a corporation which services incompetent patients. In May
1989, L.W. suffered three generalized convulsive episodes at his nursing home,
the last of which was associated with pulselessness and an apparent respiratory
arrest. On transfer to the hospital, and throughout his hospital stay, L.W. ap-
peared comatose. Within a few days of his hospital admission, L.W.'s respira-
tory effort diminished and he required ventilatory support. During his hospital
stay, tests were done which confirmed acute myocardial infarction, and a
tracheostomy was placed for chronic ventilator support. L.W.'s mental status
48. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
49. Id. at 384, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
50. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert. granted sub noma. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 109 S.
Ct. 3240 (1989).
51. Id. at 443-44 (Higgins, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing, quoting trial court opinion).
52. Id.
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never improved; his attending and consulting physicians have all opined that he
is in a permanent vegetative state.
In June 1989, L.W.'s physicians asked his guardian to authorize the with-
drawal or withholding of support systems and emergency treatment, including
artificial nutrition and hydration. L.W.'s guardian then filed a motion for de-
claratory relief, asking the court to construe applicable state law pertaining to
the authority of the guardian or the court to direct the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment.
Pursuant to case law development to date, the implementation of L.W.'s
right to direct his care must be guided by the best interests approach, not the
substituted judgment approach, because L.W.'s values and previously-expressed
treatment preferences (if any) are unknown. The best interests principle in-
structs the surrogate decisionmaker to determine the net benefit for the patient
of each treatment option, by assigning different weights to the options to reflect
the relative importance of the various interests they further or thwart, and then
subtracting the detriments from the benefits for each option.53 The course of
action to be followed is the one with the greatest net benefit to the patient.5'
Several courts have employed the best interests approach in ordering the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment from patients in a permanent vegetative
state. In Rasmussen v. Fleming,5" for instance, the Arizona Supreme Court spe-
cifically adopted the best interests approach in approving a "Do Not Resusci-
tate" (DNR) and "Do Not Hospitalize" (DNH) order for an elderly woman in
a permanent vegetative state who had given no prior indication of her desires.56
The court noted that her condition did not warrant the expenditure of every
medical effort in her behalf.57 Similarly, in In re L.H.R.,58 the court determined
that parents of an infant born in a chronic vegetative state with no hope of
developing cognitive functions could refuse treatment for him.59 And in In re
Hamlin,6" the Washington Supreme Court relied on the best interests test in
authorizing treatment termination for a permanently vegetative patient who had
been severely mentally retarded since birth and who therefore had never ex-
pressed his wishes about termination of life support."1
Nonetheless, the awkwardness of applying the best interests approach to
reach the decision to withhold treatment from L.W. and others in a permanent
vegetative state, together with philosophical considerations regarding per-
sonhood, argue strongly in favor of adoption of a neocortical brain death stan-
dard. Attempts by courts to apply the best interests approach to order termina-
tion of treatment of individuals in a permanent vegetative state have been
53. A. Buchanan & D. Brock, Deciding for Others, MILLBANK QUARTERLY 64, 67-80 (Supp. 2 1986)
[hereinafter Deciding for Others].
54. Id.
55. 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
56. Id. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
57. Id.
58. 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
59. Id. at 447, 321 S.E.2d at 723.
60. 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
61. Id. at 815, 689 P.2d at 1376. See also In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) (parents authorized to
discontinue life-support systems of irreversibly comatose, respirator-dependent newborn infant).
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heroic but unavoidably confused. A patient in a permanent vegetative state can-
not experience pain or discomfort from life-sustaining treatments. Thus, it is
difficult to argue that it is in the patient's best interests to withhold such treat-
ments on grounds that the pain and discomfort outweigh any benefits they con-
fer. Literally construed, the best interests approach might seem to require per-
petual life-sustaining treatment for those in a pain-free permanent vegetative
state.62
A closer examination of the notion of "interests" relevant to the best inter-
ests principle, however, reveals that this principle is logically inapplicable to
those in a permanent vegetative state. Indeed, recently, in two well-reasoned
opinions, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that an objective analysis
of benefits and burdens is impossible in the case of permanently vegetative pa-
tients. In In re Peter,6 3 the court explained that
Even in the case of a patient like Claire Conroy [an elderly, incompetent nursing home
resident who had severe and permanent mental and physical impairments, but who
was not in a permanent vegetative state] it can be difficult or impossible to measure
the burdens of embarrassment, frustration, helplessness, rage, and other emotional
pain, or the benefits of enjoyable feelings like contentment, joy, satisfaction, gratitude,
and well-being that the patient experiences as a result of life-sustaining treatment.
While a benefits-burdens analysis is difficult with marginally cognitive patients
like Claire Conroy, it is essentially impossible with patients in a persistent vegetative
state. By definition such patients . . . do not experience any of the benefits or burdens
that the Conroy balancing tests are intended or able to appraise.6 4
Since the permanently vegetative patient lacks and always will lack conscious-
ness of any sort, it is not only pain and suffering that becomes irrele-
vant-whether he lives or dies cannot ever matter to him either. Thus, the best
interests principle, which imposes a positive obligation to do what is most con-
ducive to the patient's good, is simply inapplicable to individuals in a permanent
vegetative state.
It might be argued that so long as there is some possibility that the progno-
sis of permanent vegetative state is erroneous, the patient does have an interest
in returning to a cognitive state.65 In other words, if there is a chance of recov-
ery, however slim, application of the best interests principle requires that we
sustain patients in a permanent vegetative state for as long as possible. How-
ever, assuming arguendo the relevance of the best interests principle, such an
argument does not reflect an accurate application of the best interests approach.
An accurate application must take into consideration not only the possibility
that the patient may return to a cognitive state, but also the probability that the
patient would be severely disabled if he/she regained consciousness. The only
well-documented cases of adults regaining consciousness after a year of perma-
nent vegetative state from hypoxia include one person who is paralyzed in three
62. Deciding for Others, supra note 53.
63. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
64. Id. at 376, 529 A.2d at 425 (footnotes omitted). Accord In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 427, 529 A.2d 434,
443 (1987).
65. Deciding for Others, supra note 53.
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limbs, emotionally unstable, and totally dependent on others for the remainder
of his life, and another person who is severely depressed and remains in a
"locked-in" condition, completely paralyzed except for the ability to blink his
eyes. 6 Being returned to such a disabled state would be regarded as of limited
benefit by most patients;67 many may consider it particularly harmful, in light
of the severe financial and emotional burdens that long-term treatment could
impose on their families and loved ones.
Clearly, then, even considering the extremely remote possibility that the
diagnosis of permanent vegetative state is wrong and the patient may regain
consciousness, the best interests principle, properly applied, does not require
that permanently unconscious patients be sustained indefinitely.68 And if the
possibility of an erroneous diagnosis is discounted as too remote, the best inter-
ests approach is of no help to treatment decisionmakers at all, since the best
interest principle is appropriately applied only to cases where treatment or non-
treatment can either serve or thwart a patient's interests. Permanently uncon-
scious patients have no more interests of the sort that the best interest principle
is designed to protect than do those who are dead. A more direct and intellectu-
ally honest approach to terminating treatment of such patients, therefore, may
be to define them as "dead."
Redefining death to include those who are permanently vegetative would
not only resolve present treatment decisionmaking dilemmas regarding such pa-
tients and avoid the awkward utilization of the best interests approach in that
regard; it would also accord with philosophical notions of what "being alive"
means. Many philosophers have convincingly argued that a given person ceases
to exist with the destruction of whatever processes there are that normally un-
derlie the person's psychological continuity and connectedness6 9 Since these
processes are those which occur in the upper brain, it may forcefully be argued
that irreversible cessation of upper-brain functioning-or permanent vegetative
state-constitutes the death of that person."0
Clinical uncertainties prevent the acceptability, presently, of redefining
death to include those in a permanent vegetative state. A key factor in ex-
panding the definition of death to include whole brain death, after all, was the
certainty of diagnosis. The medical profession thus far has been unable to
achieve the same degree of certainty of diagnosis and prognosis in vegetative
state as in cardiorespiratory or whole brain death. Although there is no more
benefit from continued treatment or continued existence for those in a perma-
nent vegetative state than there is for patients who are dead, nearly total cer-
66. Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 15, at 179-80; G. Rosenberg, S. Johnson &
R. Brenner, Recovery of Cognition after Prolonged Vegetative State, 2(2) ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY, 167-75
(1977).
67. Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 15, at 182.
68. Deciding for Others, supra note 53.
69. See Green & Wikler, Brain Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 131 (1980);
Fletcher, New Definitions of Death, 2(l) PRISM 13 (1974).
70. See also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs 265 (1965) ("Now, in the case of animals, life is defined by
their capacity for sense perception, and in the case of man by the capacity for sense perception or for thought. But
a capacity is traced back to its corresponding activity, and it is activity that counts. Consequently, life in the true
sense is perceiving or thinking.").
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tainty of prognosis must be achieved before a higher-brain death statute may
seriously be considered.
Nonetheless, since irreversible unconsciousness can, today, be diagnosed
with certainty in a significant number of cases, there should be a strong pre-
sumption against medical treatment and preservation of biological functions for
a person who is in a permanent vegetative state. As would be true with a ne-
ocortical brain death standard, such a presumption would avoid the awkward-
ness of applying a strictly construed substituted judgment approach and the
best interests approach to treatment termination decisions involving perma-
nently vegetative patients. Moreover, it would more appropriately accord with
the physician's role and result in a wiser use of limited health care resources.
The President's Commission noted that "treatment ordinarily aims to benefit a
patient through preserving life, relieving pain and suffering, protecting against
disability, and returning maximally effective functioning. '71 A physician's con-
tinued treatment of a permanently vegetative patient cannot, by definition,
bring about improvement or recovery; and it serves no "caring" purpose, be-
cause, by definition, the patient cannot and never will be able to understand or
even perceive his care, much less become comforted by it. Thus, since the goals
of medicine can no longer be served by continued treatment, the human and
fiscal health care resources of treatment are more wisely focused on preserving
health and rehabilitating patients who could benefit from treatment.
The following is a proposed model statute which would create a presump-
tion of nontreatment for patients reliably diagnosed as permanently vegetative.
Model Permanent Vegetative State Treatment Statute
For the purpose of this statute, "permanent vegetative state" means the
irreversible loss of consciousness and cognitive functions. A diagnosis of "per-
manent vegetative state" under this. section must be made in accordance with
reasonable medical standards and procedures, and it must be confirmed by a
second physician who is skilled and experienced in making neurological
diagnoses.
Upon a medical determination of permanent vegetative state, there is a
presumption that treatment will be terminated.
If the individual has not expressed a desire to be maintained on artificial
life-support systems in the event of permanent vegetative state, all artificial life-
support systems, including the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration,
will be withheld or withdrawn.
No person, firm or organization will be subject to criminal responsibility or
civil liability or charged with unprofessional conduct for participating in the
termination of artificial life-support in accordance with the procedure herein.
The termination of treatment pursuant to this chapter does not, for any
purpose, constitute suicide.
The termination of treatment pursuant to this chapter may not be used to
impair any life insurance policy in any manner.
71. Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, supra note 15, at 181.
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This chapter does not impair or supersede any person's legal right or re-
sponsibility to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures under other
circumstances.
